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Let L be a relevant logic; e.g., the system RQ of [5]. One forms the correspond-
ing first-order Peano arithmetic L], with 0,×,+, ′ (successor) as non-logical
constants, by adding the usual arithmetical axioms. E.g., form R] from RQ
by taking the following as non-logical axioms:
#1 x = y ↔ x′ = y′
#2 x = y →. x = z → y = z
#3 x′ 6= 0
#4 x+ 0 = x
#5 x+ y′ = (x+ y)′
#6 x× 0 = 0
#7 x× y′ = (x× y) + x
Not all forms of the mathematical induction principle are relevantly valid. A
sufficient form of this principle, however, is the rule RMI: “From A0 and
Ax→ Ax′, infer Ax.”
R], as formulated with #1–#7, has the interesting property of being triv-
ially absolutely consistent. In fact, consider the model of R], in the 3-point
Sugihara matrix of [1], p. 403, when the domain of the model is taken as
the integers modulo 2. On the natural assignment of arithmetical values in
the integers modulo 2 to the non-logical constants, then setting the Sugihara
value of 0 = 0 and 0′ = 0′ as 0 and of 0 = 0′ and 0′ = 0 as −1, deter-
mining values on complex formulas in the natural Sugihara way, it is readily
observed that all theorems of R] take one of the values 0,+1 in the model,
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while 0 = 0′ takes the value −1. This is evidently a finitary proof refuting
0 = 1 in first-order arithmetic, as Hilbert desired. (Moral: he should have
used R].) Similarly, every other incorrect quantifier-free equation (which may
contain variables) may be refuted. In this sense, accordingly, R] (like cer-
tain cut-free formulations of classical arithmetic, but with the proviso that
R] is formulated naturally with modus ponens for →) avoids Gödel’s second
theorem. I.e., one can prove, in the natural way, within R] that it is arith-
metically consistent, in the sense that equations which violate the addition
or multiplication tables for + and × are trivially undemonstrable. But the
impossibility of proving within R] that R] is negation-consistent is as in the
classical case.
Both intuitionist and classical Peano arithmetic (e.g., as in [2]) may be
developed within R] on well-motivated translations. Accordingly, classical
metatheory—as it involves, e.g., recursive functions and relations—may be
developed within R]. It follows, e.g., that R] is essentially undecidable in
a Tarskian sense; i.e., all its negation-consistent extensions are undecidable
(provided, of course, that it is consistent). But the structure of R]-theories
is much richer than in the classical case; inconsistent but non-trivial theories
in particular are admitted, and some of these may be decidable. (Essentially,
one such was just exhibited in setting out the basic arithmetical consistency
argument.)
Although, in a sense, R] contains intuitionist Peano arithmetic (and in
particular licenses, on translation, all intuitionist arguments, though not, in
the direct sense, all intuitionist theorems), it is much more closely related
to the classical system. Classical arithmetic P] is contained in R] on exact
and homomorphic translation, but not necessarily on the direct translation.
Question: are there formulas of the vocabulary of P] (i.e., not containing
any relevant implications) which are theorems of P] but not R]? Answer: I
don’t know. For large classes of formulas of P], it is possible to show that
they will be theorems of P] iff they are theorems of R]; these include, e.g.,
the elementary arithmetical theorems proved for P] formally in [2]. Caution:
some of these questions are delicate; relevant counterparts of some classical
laws—e.g., involving cancellation—fail, for what seem to be good relevant
reasons (though this view is subject to change), when they are inaccurately
formulated. But, in the classical vocabulary, all those investigated that hold
classically hold relevantly.
It is to be noted that it would suffice (though it is not necessary) to show
that P] is exactly contained in R] on the natural translation to show that
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Ackermann’s rule γ (modus ponens for material implication) is admissible in
R]. This is an old problem for relevant theories (cf., [1]) which arises anew
on each extension of insight. Note that the admissibility of γ for R], in view
of its arithmetical consistency, implies the negation-consistency not only of
R] but of P]. Accordingly, for reasons like those raised in [3], a proof of γ
for R], if there is one, cannot be elementary. Since R] itself is incomplete, for
Gödelian reasons, it may not have the necessary stability to admit γ. But I
have no conjecture either way. (I do note, however, that if R] is enriched with
an ω-rule (from An for each numeral n, infer ∀xAx), to form a system Rω,
then it will admit γ for all formulas (including statements involving relevant
→, on which even Rω remains incomplete, while including all the intuitive
arithmetic truths in its classical part).
Research has just begun into application of the relevant logics developed
in [1] and elsewhere. However it seems clear, even in the initial stages, that
both new insights and new technical results, even for classical systems, are
to be expected from this research. Note that one is not wedded to R for
the development of these theories; the systems E and RM of [1] seem equally
appropriate, and perhaps in some ways more appropriate. And I am particu-
larly indebted, in setting out both technical material and comments thereon,
to J. Michael Dunn, with whom I have discussed the issues arising out of the
application of relevant logics—to arithmetic in particular—over a number of
years, and whose ideas have played a continuing role in developments here.
A detailed development of the present material will be found in [4], and in
some successor volume to [1].
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